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SENNE V. VILLAGE OF PALATINE: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S 
PARKING TICKET PAYOUT 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 20, 2010, Jason Senne parked his car overnight on a public way 
in violation of the Village of Palatine’s parking ordinance.1 A police officer 
printed Senne a twenty-dollar parking ticket and left it on his windshield.2 The 
ticket was printed on the Village’s standard form and included Senne’s name, 
address, driver’s license number, date of birth, sex, height, and weight.3 Upon 
receipt of this ticket, Senne proceeded to bring a class action lawsuit, along 
with other parking violators, against the Village for violation of the Federal 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (the DPPA or Act).4 The DPPA prohibits the 
disclosure of personal information obtained from a State Department of Motor 
Vehicles (DMV) unless the disclosure falls under one of the statute’s fourteen 
exceptions.5 The DPPA was passed to prevent criminals from obtaining 
personal information from state DMVs for a nominal fee.6 On August 6, 2012, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the Village 
of Palatine’s windshield parking tickets amounted to a disclosure under the 
DPPA, and that the city violated the DPPA unless every piece of personal 
information on the ticket was necessary under the governmental or service of 
process exceptions.7 This decision could potentially turn a twenty-dollar ticket8 
into an automatic $2500 claim against the Village, resulting in a potential total 
liability to the city of eighty million dollars.9 The majority asserted that the aim 
of the DPPA’s language and legislative intent is to protect against any 
disclosure of personal information obtained from a DMV that is not necessary 
“for use” under one of the statute’s exceptions.10 This Comment will examine 
 
 1. Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 695 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2850 (2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)–(b)(14) (2000). 
 6. The Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) and the Privacy of Your State Motor Vehicle 
Record, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/drivers/ (last 
visited July 29, 2013). 
 7. Senne, 695 F.3d at 608–09. 
 8. Id. at 600. 
 9. Id. at 611 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 606–607 (majority opinion). 
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the legislative and judicial history of the DPPA and the Seventh Circuit’s 
struggle in interpreting the language of this statute. The author will argue that 
the plain meaning interpretation of the statute appears to allow any use of 
personal information for the stated exception purposes, and as this language is 
unambiguous, the court need not consult legislative intent. Furthermore, upon 
examining its original intent, the legislature may disagree with the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation, which potentially creates severe liabilities for 
municipalities and serves to benefit “scofflaws.”11 As Judge Posner aptly states 
in his dissent, from now on, “only a sucker would park legally in the Village of 
Palatine.”12 
I.  HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRIVER’S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 
(DPPA) 
In 1994, Congress enacted the DPPA in response to a series of crimes 
resulting from the purchase of personal information from state DMVs.13 The 
murder of the young aspiring actress, Rebecca Schaeffer, served as a catalyst 
for this legislation.14 Robert John Bardo, an obsessed fan, hired a private 
investigator to obtain Schaeffer’s address.15 For a four-dollar fee, the private 
investigator acquired Schaeffer’s information from the California DMV.16 
Armed with this information, Bardo drove to Schaeffer’s home and shot her in 
the chest.17 
The legislative hearings and debates surrounding the enactment of the 
DPPA discussed other crimes that highlighted the need for this statute.18 In 
Iowa, a group of robbers used the license plate numbers of expensive cars to 
obtain the victims’ addresses and proceeded to rob their homes.19 In California, 
a man used the license plate numbers of five women in their early twenties to 
obtain their addresses from the DMV and sent them disturbing letters.20 One 
such letter stated, “I looked for you though all I knew about you was your 
license plate. Now I know more and yet nothing. I know you’re a Libra, but I 
don’t know what it’s like to smell your hair while I’m kissing your neck and 
 
 11. Id. at 612 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 12. Senne, 695 F.3d at 612 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 13. The Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) and the Privacy of Your State Motor Vehicle 
Record, supra note 6. 
 14. See 139 CONG. REC. S29,466 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer); See 
also Senne, 695 F.3d at 607. 
 15. Beth Johnson, A Fan’s Fatal Obsession, ENT. WKLY. (July 14, 1995), http://www.ew. 
com/ew/article/0,,297902,00.html. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 19–27. 
 19. 139 CONG. REC. 27,327 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Moran). 
 20. 139 CONG. REC. S29,466 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer). 
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holding you in my arms.”21 In Virginia, after visiting her doctor to save her 
pregnancy, Karen Stewart received a hurtful letter from an anti-abortion group, 
which obtained her address by noting her license plate number while she was 
at her doctor’s office.22 That particular office also performed abortions.23 The 
letter included references to “God’s curses for the shedding innocent 
blood . . .” and to “the guilt of having killed one’s own child.”24 These words 
were especially stinging because Karen miscarried shortly after her visit.25 
David Beatty, as the Director of Public Affairs of the National Victim Center, 
testified to several instances of abuse victims who could not escape their 
abusers because of the availability of this information through state DMVs.26 
Beatty stressed that “in the vast majority of cases, the hunter needs no such 
specialized trainig [sic] or knowledge to find their prey. They need only 
find . . . a DMV office.”27 
One of the bill’s main proponents, Senator Barbara Boxer, acknowledged 
at that time “[i]n 34 States, someone [could] walk into a State Motor Vehicle 
Department with your license plate number and a few dollars and walk out 
with your name and home address.”28 She stressed that even if an individual 
had an unlisted phone number or address, “someone [could] find [his or her] 
name or see [his or her] car, go to the DMV and obtain the very personal 
information that [he or she] may have taken painful steps to restrict.”29 
Congressman James P. Moran, also a co-sponsor of the bill, echoed Senator 
Boxer’s concerns and argued the DPPA “will stop State government from 
being an accomplice to the crime.”30 
However, Congressman Morgan also acknowledged that certain 
institutions still require access to state DMV information.31 In drafting the 
DPPA, Morgan assured that: 
  Careful consideration was given to the common uses now made of this 
information and great efforts were made to ensure that those uses were 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. 139 CONG. REC. S15,766 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Harkin). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Davis Beatty, Protecting Drive Privacy: Driver’s Privacy Bill of 1993, HOUSE OF REP. 
JUD. CIVIL AND CONST. (Feb. 3, 1994), available at 1994 WL 212822. 
 27. Beatty, 1994 WL 212822. 
 28. 139 CONG. REC. S29,466 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer). 
 29. Id. 
 30. 139 CONG. REC. 27,328 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Moran). 
 31. James P. Moran, Protecting Driver Privacy: Statement of Congressman James P. Moran 
before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights on H.R. 3365, the Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act of 1993, HOUSE OF REP. JUD. CIVIL AND CONST., Feb. 3, 1994, available at 1994 
WL 212698. 
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allowed. . . . Among those who will continue to have unfettered access are 
federal and state governments and their contractors, for use in auto recalls, by 
businesses (such as an insurance company) to verify the accuracy of personal 
information submitted by a licensee, for use in any civil or criminal 
proceeding, in research activities, and in marketing activities as long as the 
individual has been given the opportunity to opt out.32 
Although Congress recognized the importance of the DPPA’s ability to 
prevent future crimes, it also emphasized that certain entities require open 
access to this information.33 Congress finally enacted the DPPA in 1994 as part 
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.34 
II.  THE DRIVER’S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 
As currently enacted, the DPPA provides that a state’s DMV “shall not 
knowingly disclose or otherwise make available” the following: (1) personal 
information except as allowed in 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b); or (2) highly restricted 
personal information without the express consent of the person, except as 
“permitted in subsections (b)(1) [governmental functions], (b)(4) [legal 
proceedings], (b)(6) [insurance investigations], and (b)(9) [verification of 
commercial driver’s licenses] . . . .”35 Personal information includes a driver’s 
identification number, name, address (but not zip code), and telephone 
number.36 An individual’s photograph, social security number, and medical or 
disability information is classified as “highly restricted personal 
information.”37 Under subsection (b) of the DPPA, Congress has listed 
fourteen exceptions where the disclosure of this personal information is 
permitted.38 A few of these exceptions include: “[f]or use in connection with 
matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft . . . .”;39 for use by insurers 
“in connection with claims investigation activities, antifraud activities, and 
rating or underwriting”;40 and for use in bulk marketing if individuals 
consent.41 The exceptions pertinent to Senne v. Village of Palatine include: 
(b)(1) “[f]or use by any government agency . . . in carrying out its 
functions . . .”42 and (b)(4) “[f]or use in connection with any civil, criminal, 
 
 32. Moran, 1994 WL 212698. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–25). 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. § 2725(3). 
 37. Id. § 2725(4). 
 38. Id. § 2721(b). 
 39. Id. § 2721(b)(2). 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(6). 
 41. Id. § 2721(b)(12). 
 42. Id. § 2721(b)(1). 
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administrative, or arbitral proceedings . . . including the service of 
process . . . .”43 Finally, “[a]n authorized recipient of personal information . . . 
may resell or redisclose the information only for a use permitted under 
subsection (b) . . . .”44 
The United States may bring an action against private and public parties, 
including states, for a violation of the DPPA and may impose criminal and 
civil fines.45 In addition, the statute creates a private cause of action and 
mandates that a “person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal 
information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under 
this chapter shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains, 
who may bring a civil action in a United States district court.”46 The court may 
award: (1) “actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount 
of $2,500”; (2) “punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard 
of the law”; (3) “reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . .”; and (4) “such other 
preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be appropriate.”47 
III.  COURT INTERPRETATION 
A. Constitutionality 
After a series of cases,48 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the DPPA’s 
constitutionality in Reno v. Condon.49 There, the Court established that 
Congress has authority, under the Commerce Clause, to regulate motor vehicle 
information because this personal information is an “article of commerce” 
being sold by the States to parties “engaged in interstate commerce” for them 
to use to “contact drivers with customized solicitations,” and is used in the 
“stream of interstate commerce” by various entities in regards to interstate 
motoring.50 In this context, the sale or release of this information into the 
“interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional 
regulation.”51 Furthermore, the Court held the DPPA did not violate the Tenth 
Amendment and its federalism principles because it does not “require the 
 
 43. Id. § 2721(b)(4). 
 44. Id. § 2721(c). 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 2723. 
 46. Id. § 2724(a). 
 47. Id. § 2724(b). 
 48. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
Federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2721 to 2725, 183 A.L.R. FED. 37 
(2003). 
 49. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 141 (2000). South Carolina’s laws were in direct conflict 
with provisions of the DPPA; therefore, South Carolina and its Attorney General filed suit 
alleging the DPPA was unconstitutional. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 141–42. 
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States in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens” or “enact any 
laws or regulations,” nor does it “require state officials to assist in the 
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.”52 Instead, the 
DPPA simply regulates the States as owners of databases.53 
In addition, in Travis v. Reno, the Seventh Circuit also upheld the 
constitutionality of the DPPA against several other constitutional attacks.54 The 
Seventh Circuit held that the DPPA did not violate the Eleventh Amendment 
because the DPPA allows only the United States, not private individuals, to 
bring suits against any State or state agency.55 Although the plaintiffs claimed 
the DPPA violated the First Amendment by “limiting . . . access to information 
in public records,” the Seventh Circuit found that “[p]eering into public 
records is not part of the ‘freedom of speech’ that the first amendment 
protects.”56 Finally, the plaintiffs in Travis contended that the DPPA violates 
Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, the Guarantee Clause, 
which guarantees to every State a “Republican Form of Government . . . .”57 
The Seventh Circuit, however, held that this argument had little merit because 
“[n]o sensible person believes that the supremacy clause, which explicitly 
binds states to federal law, contradicts the guarantee clause and thereby puts 
the Constitution at war with itself.”58 Instead, the court found that the DPPA 
“leaves the state’s internal and political affairs alone and regulates only how it 
interacts with private parties who seek information in its possession.”59 
B. Interpretation 
1. Bringing Suit 
The DPPA limits the individuals and entities that can bring suit under its 
provisions.60 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2723, the United States can impose criminal 
and civil fines for a violation of the Act against private and public parties 
including states.61 In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 2724 authorizes a private suit 
 
 52. Id. at 142. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1001–02 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 
(2000). In Travis v. Reno, Wisconsin’s DMV and its Director sued to challenge the 
constitutionality of the DPPA because they claimed the DPPA would require them to make costly 
changes to their procedures and cause Wisconsin to lose eight million dollars in annual revenue 
from selling mailing lists. Id. at 1002. 
 55. Id. at 1006–07. 
 56. Id. at 1007. 
 57. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 58. Travis, 163 F.3d at 1007. 
 59. Id. at 1008. 
 60. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723–2724 (2000). 
 61. Id. § 2723. 
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against any “person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal 
information . . . for a purpose not permitted . . .” and they “shall be liable to the 
individual to whom the information pertains . . . .”62 A “person” includes “an 
individual, organization or entity, but . . . not . . . a State or agency thereof.”63 
Beyond these articulated actions, courts have hesitated to extend the 
availability of private suits to other individuals, including individuals seeking 
disclosure.64 
Further, in Margan v. Niles, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of New York interpreted the range of possible plaintiffs and 
defendants under the DPPA very broadly.65 In Margan, a workers’ 
compensation administrator hired private investigators to determine if Niles 
was disabled.66 Niles gave the license plate numbers of the investigators to a 
police officer friend who used information from the New York DMV to obtain 
the investigators’ addresses.67 Niles then sent threatening messages to the 
investigators at their homes.68 The investigators and their families sued Niles, 
the police officer, and the municipality that employed the police officer.69 
Their claims included violation of the DPPA and conspiracy to violate the 
DPPA.70 First, the court held that from the language of the statute “any 
individual whose address was obtained from a motor vehicle record is a proper 
plaintiff,” including spouses and children whose addresses appear but who may 
not be the “motor vehicle operator.”71 The court expanded the possible 
plaintiffs under the DPPA because: (1) the statute references “an individual” to 
whom the information pertains, not a “motor vehicle operator[],” and (2) by 
using the indefinite article of “an” in “an individual,” the “language is broad 
enough to include personal information pertaining to individuals other than the 
motor vehicle operator . . . .”72 In addition, in Margan the court held that a 
municipality could be vicariously liable under the DPPA for the actions of its 
 
 62. Id. § 2724(a). 
 63. Id. § 2725(2). 
 64. See, e.g., McCready v. White, 417 F.3d 700, 701, 703–04 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
an individual requesting disclosure under the DPPA had no private right of action because 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 only authorizes a remedy against State actors in the absence of express statutory 
language to the contrary when the statute creates person-specific rights); see also Pichler v. 
UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 241 (E.D. Pa. 2005), aff’d, 542 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that “the 
only ‘interest’ that the DPPA protects is an individual’s interest in the privacy of motor vehicle 
records that include information about her.”). 
 65. Margan v. Niles, 250 F. Supp. 2d 63, 77 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 66. Id. at 66. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Margan, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 66. 
 71. Id. at 70. 
 72. Id. (emphasis added). 
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police officers because “‘[w]hen Congress creates a tort action, it legislates 
against the legal background of ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules 
and consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.’”73 
Furthermore, although § 2724(a) and § 2725(2) explicitly exempt States and 
state agencies from civil liability,74 municipalities are not given the same 
exemption.75 The court in Margan did, however, slightly restrict potential suits 
brought under the DPPA by stating that a plaintiff cannot bring a cause of 
action for conspiracy to violate the DPPA because the statute does not create 
that independent cause of action.76 
In order for a person to be liable under the DPPA, they must “knowingly 
obtain[], disclose[] or use[] personal information, from a motor vehicle record, 
for a purpose not permitted . . . .”77 In Pichler v. UNITE, a union collected 
license plate numbers of employees from a factory parking lot, obtained their 
addresses from DMV records, and visited employees at their homes.78 These 
employees sued the union for violating the DPPA, and the union claimed it had 
used this practice since the 1970s and did not know it violated the DPPA.79 
The United States Court of Appeals for Third Circuit, however, held that a 
defendant need not “know” that their actions are impermissible under the 
DPPA in order to be held liable for actual or liquidated damages, and instead 
need only knowingly obtain, disclose or use the personal information.80 
Otherwise, the reading of the DPPA becomes “incomprehensible” because it 
would make “every single violation one for which punitive damages would 
apply.”81 
Under § 2724(b)(1), as a remedy for the private cause of action allowed 
under the DPPA, “[t]he court may award . . . actual damages, but not less than 
liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500 . . . .”82 Under this category of 
 
 73. Id. at 74–75 (quoting Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 280 (2003)). 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a) (2000) (“[a] person . . . shall be liable to the individual to whom the 
information pertains . . . .”); Id. § 2725(2) (“‘person’ means an individual, organization or entity, 
but does not include a State or agency thereof . . . .”). 
 75. Margan, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 75. 
 76. Id. at 76. 
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a) (emphasis added). 
 78. Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 383–84 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1127 
(2009). 
 79. Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 236, 239–40 (E.D. Pa. 2005), aff’d, 542 F.3d 380 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
 80. Pichler, 542 F.3d at 396–97; see also Rios v. Direct Mail Express, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 
1199, 1205 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (“under the express language of the DPPA the term ‘knowingly’ only 
modifies the phrase ‘obtains, discloses, or uses personal information.’ It does not modify the 
phrase ‘for a purpose not permitted under this Chapter.’”). 
 81. Pichler, 542 F.3d at 397; 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(2) (“[t]he court may award . . . punitive 
damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law. . . .”). 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(1). 
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damages, courts have held that a party need not prove actual damages in order 
to collect the $2500 liquidated damages.83 In Pichler v. UNITE, the Third 
Circuit held that proof of actual damages was not required under the DPPA 
because (1) the language limits the court’s authority by creating a damage 
award floor whether or not the plaintiff can prove statutory damages; and (2) 
the phrase “liquidated damages” illustrates Congress’s intent to substitute these 
damages for actual damages when they are uncertain or immeasurable.84 In 
addition, the court in Pichler held that although a single plaintiff could not get 
cumulative damages for a single instance of disclosure and use, they may be 
able to recover cumulative damages if the defendant repeatedly used or 
disclosed their information.85 Furthermore, in Kehoe v. Fidelity Federal Bank 
& Trust, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that 
the introductory language of § 2724(b), stating “[t]he court may award,”86 
indicates that courts have a “degree of discretion” in fashioning the appropriate 
award.87 
Finally, although the “DPPA provides no statute of limitation for actions 
brought under its provisions; civil actions arising under federal law . . . must be 
brought within four years of the action giving rise to the suit” under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1658(a).88 
2. Exceptions Applicability 
a. Governmental Functions 
Courts have interpreted the governmental functions exception broadly, 
with the exception encompassing several different uses by government 
agencies.89 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1), motor vehicle information may be 
disclosed “[f]or use by any government agency, including any court or law 
 
 83. See Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 547 U.S. 1051 (2006); see also Pichler, 542 F.3d at 398. 
 84. Pichler, 542 F.3d at 398–99; see also Kehoe, 421 F.3d at 1213 (holding under the plain 
meaning of the statute, a “plaintiff need not prove actual damages to be awarded liquidated 
damages” because (1) no language “confines liquidated damages to people who suffered actual 
damages” and (2) “[s]ince liquidated damages are an appropriate substitute for potentially 
uncertain and unmeasurable actual damages of a privacy violation, it follows that proof of actual 
damages is not necessary for an award of liquidated damages.”). 
 85. Pichler, 542 F.3d at 393–94 (holding that the loss or injury that might have been 
anticipated for these liquidated damages was “one instance of obtaining and one of use,” but 
when a defendant repeatedly uses an individual’s information, the statute’s language that “the 
court may award” “indicates a degree of discretion granted to the court in awarding damages.”). 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b) (emphasis added). 
 87. Kehoe, 421 F.3d at 1216–17. 
 88. Hurst v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 10–1001–GMS, 2012 WL 426018, at *9 
(D. Del. Feb. 9, 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2006). 
 89. See infra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions, or any private person or 
entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State, or local agency in carrying out its 
functions.”90 In Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, the Superior 
Court of Connecticut held that the tax assessor’s use of DMV personal 
information was allowed as a governmental function under § 2721(b)(1).91 
Furthermore, the court required the assessor to release the master list of name, 
address, and vehicle registration information gathered from the DMV to the 
public for inspection because such inspection was part of the tax assessor’s 
function as a government agency.92 Also, under this exception, several courts 
have allowed state DMVs to disclose this information to third party contractors 
that send registration renewal notices along with advertisements to help offset 
the DMV’s costs.93 In Parus v. Kroeplin, the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Wisconsin held that under the governmental functions 
exception, a police dispatcher was allowed to give DMV information to a 
warden with the Department of Natural Resources, even though the warden 
used the information for his own personal purpose.94 Finally, in Trautmann ex 
rel. Trautmann v. Christie, the Superior Court of New Jersey held that the 
State’s requirement that holders of special permits under the age of twenty-one 
display decals on their vehicles did not violate the DPPA.95 Although this use 
may arguably fall under the governmental functions exception, the court held it 
did not violate the DPPA because an “age group” is not personal information 
under the DPPA; therefore, the DPPA does not apply to this information.96 
b. Driver’s Safety and Commercial Licenses 
Subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 2721, before listing the DPPA’s fourteen 
exceptions, starts with a broad exception allowing the disclosure of personal 
information “for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver 
 
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1). 
 91. Davis v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n et al., 790 A.2d 1188, 1192–93 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2001). 
 92. Id. at 1193. 
 93. See Downing v. Globe Direct LLC, 682 F.3d 18, 22–24 (1st Cir. 2012); Rine v. Imagitas, 
Inc., 590 F.3d 1215, 1223–26 (11th Cir. 2009). However, this decision as to the issue of 
solicitation tied with an excepted use could change pursuant to the Supreme Court’s grant of 
certiorari in Maracich v. Spears, 675 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 98 (U.S. 
Sept. 25, 2012) (No. 12–25). 
 94. Parus v. Kroeplin, 402 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1007 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (reasoning that if the 
court were to hold otherwise “police dispatchers would be required to second-guess the requests 
of law enforcement officials any time an officer requested protected information in a manner 
deemed by the dispatcher to be less than obvious or routine.”). 
 95. Trautmann ex rel. Trautmann v. Christie, 15 A.3d 22, 25–26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2011). 
 96. Id. at 26. 
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safety . . . .”97 Furthermore, § 2721(b)(9) states that personal information may 
be released “[f]or use by an employer . . . to obtain or verify information 
relating to a holder of a commercial driver’s license . . . .”98 Based on these 
two exceptions, the Wisconsin Appellate court in Atlas Transit Inc. v. Korte 
held that schools are allowed to disclose bus drivers’ names and driver’s 
license numbers to the public because this disclosure is in connection with 
driver safety and for use by the employer to verify that they hold a commercial 
driver’s license.99 This case illustrates that more than one exception may 
permit the disclosure of personal DMV information in a particular case.100 
c. Investigation in Anticipation of Litigation vs. Solicitation 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4), DMV personal information may be 
disclosed: 
For use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral 
proceeding in any Federal, State, or local court or agency or before any self-
regulatory body, including the service of process, investigation in anticipation 
of litigation, and the execution or enforcement of judgments and orders, or 
pursuant to an order of a Federal, State, or local court.101 
However, § 2721(b)(12) states that in order to use this information in “bulk 
distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations,” the State must obtain “the 
express consent of the person to whom such personal information pertains.”102 
In Maracich v. Spears, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit found that an attorney’s use of DMV information to solicit potential 
clients for litigation fell under the exception in § 2721(b)(4), as an 
“investigation in anticipation of litigation.”103 Although the plaintiffs argued 
this fell under the “solicitation exception” requiring their consent, codified in § 
2721(b)(12), the court held that where solicitation “is an accepted and expected 
element of, and is inextricably intertwined with, conduct satisfying the 
litigation exception under the DPPA, such solicitation is not actionable by 
persons to whom the personal information pertains.”104 Nevertheless, the 
interpretation of the DPPA’s exceptions in this area may continue to develop 
as the U.S. Supreme Court has granted writ of certiorari to review this case.105 
 
 97. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (2000). 
 98. Id. § 2721(b)(9). 
 99. Atlas Transit, Inc. v. Korte, 638 N.W.2d 625, 633 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001). 
 100. Id. 
 101. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4). 
 102. Id. § 2721(b)(12). 
 103. Maracich v. Spears, 675 F.3d 281, 283–84 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 98 
(U.S. Sept. 25, 2012) (No. 12–25); 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4). 
 104. Maracich, 675 F.3d at 283–84. 
 105. Id. at 281, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 98 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2012) (No. 12–25). 
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Furthermore, in Pichler v. UNITE, union organizers argued their use of 
DMV information was tied with the “litigation exception” under § 
2721(b)(4)’s “investigation in anticipation of litigation” clause.106 However, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to extend the 
DPPA’s enumerated exceptions to include a use not specifically articulated in 
the statute, namely “union organizing,” because the “statute clearly prevents 
obtaining or using personal information ‘for a purpose not permitted under this 
chapter.’”107 The court held that “[t]he Act contains no language that would 
excuse an impermissible use merely because it was executed in conjunction 
with a permissible purpose.”108 This ruling seems to be in conflict with 
Maracich and “the advertising registration renewal cases” such as Downing v. 
Globe Direct Inc., because both of those cases involved solicitation without 
consent allowed “in conjunction” with other permissible purposes.109 
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will resolve this division amongst the circuits in 
its review of Maracich on writ of certiorari.110 
d. Resale and Redisclosure 
The courts are also split regarding the interpretation of § 2721(c), which 
allows for the resale and redisclosure by “authorized recipient[s]” of personal 
information obtained from the DMV.111 In Russell v. Choicepoint Services, 
Inc., the plaintiffs alleged the defendant obtained their DMV information for 
the impermissible purpose of disclosure and distribution by resale to their 
customers.112 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana held that under the plain language of the DPPA, an “authorized 
recipient” is not required to have a permissible use for the information, but 
instead, under § 2721(c) could resell or redisclose the information to an end 
user for their permissible use.113 Furthermore, the court found the “recipients” 
were “authorized” by the States serving as the gatekeeper of this 
 
 106. Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 395 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1127 (2009); 
18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4). 
 107. Pichler, 542 F.3d at 396 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a)). 
 108. Id. at 395. 
 109. Maracich, 675 F.3d at 283–84, 296; Downing v. Globe Direct LLC, 682 F.3d 18, 22–24 
(1st Cir. 2012). 
 110. Maracich, 675 F.3d, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 98 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2012) (No. 12–25). 
 111. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c). 
 112. Russell v. Choicepoint Servs., Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 654, 657 (E.D. La. 2004). 
 113. Id. at 664 (“[t]he language of 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c) permitting resale and redisclosure by 
‘authorized recipients’ instead of ‘authorized users’ or ‘permissible users’ indicates Congress’s 
anticipation that entities . . . would obtain drivers’ personal information from DMVs strictly to 
redistribute it to persons with permissible uses.”). See also, e.g., Young v. W. Publ’g Corp., 724 
F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Graczyk v. W. Publ’g Co., 660 F.3d 275, 279–80 (7th 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2391 (2012); Taylor v. Acxiom Corp., 612 F.3d 325, 336 (5th 
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 908 (2011). 
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information.114 However, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Missouri in Wiles v. Worldwide Information, Inc., another reseller 
case, held just the opposite—that the term “authorized recipient” is only an 
entity that obtains this personal information for one of the permissible uses 
under § 2721(b) because: (1) the “resale and redisclosure” provision directly 
follows these fourteen permissible uses in the statute; and (2) in Reno v. 
Condon, the U.S. Supreme Court in dicta suggested this same interpretation.115 
Furthermore, the court held that it would be “simply illogical that Congress 
intended to delegate to the States the right to decide who could purchase the 
DMV records, since the DPPA was passed specifically to restrict the States’ 
sales of those DMV records.”116 The court in Wiles also found that a reseller 
violates the DPPA when it provides its customers an entire database of DMV 
information, although the customer only had a permissible purpose for some of 
the drivers’ information.117 However, the Western District of Missouri in Cook 
v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc. held just a year before Wiles that the 
stockpiling of driver records was allowed for parties who may have a 
permissible use in the future.118 
In conclusion, the courts have struggled to interpret the DPPA’s exceptions 
and this struggle continued in Senne v. Village of Palatine. 
IV.  SENNE V. VILLAGE OF PALATINE 
A. Background Facts 
Jason Senne parked his car overnight on a public way in violation of the 
Village of Palatine’s parking ordinance.119 A Village police officer placed a 
twenty-dollar parking citation under the windshield wiper blade of Senne’s 
vehicle at 1:35 AM, and the ticket remained on the car until Senne removed it 
 
 114. Russell, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (“[i]t is doubtful that Congress employed the term 
‘authorized’ to refer to the DPPA directly sanctioning a recipient because the Act otherwise 
speaks in terms of ‘use’ rather than ‘user’ and it provides no process or guidelines for 
authorization.”). 
 115. Wiles v. Worldwide Info., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1071 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (citing 
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 146 (2000) (equating authorized recipients with “private persons 
who have obtained drivers’ personal information for one of the aforementioned permissible 
purposes to further disclose that information for any one of those purposes.”)). 
 116. Wiles, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 
 117. Id. at 1080–81. 
 118. Cook v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109 (W.D. Mo. 
2010). See also Taylor, 612 F.3d at 335, 337, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 908 (2011) (allowing 
private entities to buy DMV personal information in bulk and keep it, although they may only use 
some of it for permitted uses at that point in time). 
 119. Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 695 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2850 (2013). 
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five hours later.120 The ticket consisted of several fields of electronically-
printed information including “the make, model, color, year, license number 
and vehicle identification number . . . . [Senne’s] full name, address, driver’s 
license number, date of birth, sex, height and weight.”121 The ticket provided 
that Senne could either pay the fine in person, through the mail using the 
citation that doubled as an envelope, or request a hearing to contest the 
citation.122 
B. Procedural Posture 
Following these events, Senne filed a claim in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois for himself and a putative class 
requesting statutory liquidated damages, injunctive relief in the form of a 
temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction prohibiting the 
Village from printing personal information on its parking tickets.123 The 
Village filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),124 for failure to state a 
claim, in which it argued: (1) the Village’s parking ticket did not amount to a 
disclosure; and (2) if the court did find it to be a disclosure, the Village’s 
actions were permitted under the exceptions listed in the DPPA.125 In an oral 
ruling, the district court agreed that the Village’s parking tickets was not a 
“disclosure,” and also found that the DPPA’s governmental function exception 
in § 2721(b)(1) and possibly other exceptions would apply regardless.126 
On appeal, a Seventh Circuit three-judge panel held that the parking ticket 
did amount to a disclosure, but affirmed the district court’s decision that this 
disclosure was allowed under the statute’s exceptions, specifically the service 
of process exception listed in § 2721(b)(4).127 However, the Seventh Circuit 
agreed to rehear the case en banc.128 
The Seventh Circuit held the parking ticket constituted a disclosure under 
the DPPA because it fell within the broad statutory language, “disclose or 
 
 120. Id. at 600. 
 121. Id.; See infra image accompanying note 238. 
 122. Senne, 695 F.3d at 600. The Seventh Circuit does not discuss the possible disclosure 
from mailing this envelope in with the personal information printed on its outside, id., but in his 
Complaint, Senne argued by using these envelopes that “individuals are unwittingly disclosing 
their personal information to anyone who comes in contact with the returned citation.” 
Complaint-Class Action for Damages and Other Relief Under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act 
at 5, Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 695 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 10–3243), 2010 WL 
3459438, at *17. 
 123. Senne, 695 F.3d at 600. 
 124. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 125. Senne, 695 F.3d at 600. 
 126. Id. at 600–01. 
 127. Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 645 F.3d 919, 920, 923–24 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 695 
F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 128. Senne, 695 F.3d at 599. 
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otherwise make available to any person or entity.”129 Next, the Seventh Circuit 
remanded the case to the district court to determine if each piece of the 
disclosed information was necessary “for use” in carrying out the purpose of 
the exceptions.130 In his dissent, Judge Posner agreed that the parking ticket 
was a disclosure but argued, based on the literal interpretation of the DPPA, 
that the Village’s disclosure fell under the DPPA’s service of process 
exception, § 2721(b)(4).131 Judge Flaum’s dissent, joined by Judges 
Easterbrook, Posner, and Sykes, also agreed that the ticket was a disclosure, 
but disagreed with the majority’s view that “permissible disclosures are limited 
to such information as is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the statutory 
exceptions” because neither the text nor the legislative intent of the DPPA 
presented this limitation.132 These conflicting arguments will be further 
analyzed below.133 
Following the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, the Village of Palatine filed (1) a 
writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court and (2) a motion to stay the 
mandate.134 The Seventh Circuit denied the motion to stay,135 and the Supreme 
Court denied the Village’s writ.136 Furthermore, as a result of this case, the 
Village of Palatine has amended its parking ticket procedures.137 
C. Analysis of Senne v. Village of Palatine 
1. “Disclosure” 
The Village of Palatine first argued that the display of the parking ticket on 
Senne’s windshield was not a “disclosure” under the DPPA because a 
disclosure requires that a third party actually see the information; therefore, as 
Senne failed to allege another party saw his ticket, a disclosure did not 
occur.138 The district court agreed with this argument stating that “what the 
 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (2000); Senne, 695 F.3d at 601–603. 
 130. Senne, 695 F.3d at 608–609. 
 131. Id. at 610, 612 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. at 612 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
 133. See infra Part IV.C. 
 134. Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 695 F.3d 617, 618 (7th Cir. 2012); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Senne, 695 F.3d 597 (No. 12–573). 
 135. Senne, 695 F.3d at 618–19 (denying the Village’s motion for stay because it did not 
establish that its petition for writ of certiorari would likely succeed on the merits and that the 
Village would suffer irreparable harm absent the stay). 
 136. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 134; Vill. of Palatine, Ill. v. Senne, 133 S. Ct. 
2850 (2013). 
 137. Oral Argument at 42:20–42:30, Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 695 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (No. 10–3243), available at http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2012/migrated. 
orig.10-3243_02_09_2012.mp3. 
 138. Brief of the Defendant-Appellee Vill. of Palatine, Ill. at 9, Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 
695 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 10–3243). 
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statute is talking about is what people commonly call a disclosure, which is 
turning something over to somebody else.”139 However, the Seventh Circuit, 
including the dissenting judges, disagreed with the district court’s 
interpretation.140 First, the Seventh Circuit held that “such an interpretation 
ignores the broad language [disclose or otherwise make available] employed 
by Congress to define and regulate disclosures.”141 Second, this reading 
proposed by the Village “turns the statutory structure on its head” because the 
default rule is that a person authorized to view the information is prohibited 
from sharing it, unless the statute specifically authorizes the disclosure for that 
“limited object” and to those “limited class of recipients.”142 
Next, the Village argued that the parking ticket did not constitute a 
disclosure under the meaning of the statute because the police did not 
“knowingly disclose” the information.143 The Village claimed that the police 
did not intend for the theft of the information nor did they know it would 
happen; therefore, it was not liable because the statute does not impose liability 
for accidental disclosures.144 However, according to the Seventh Circuit, the 
Village’s argument “fundamentally misunderstands the term ‘knowingly.’ 
Voluntary action, not knowledge of illegality or potential consequences, is 
sufficient to satisfy the mens rea element of the DPPA.”145 
2. Permitted Uses: Governmental Function and Service of Process 
As both the Seventh Circuit majority and dissent reasoned that the 
Village’s parking ticket constituted a disclosure,146 the more important inquiry 
became whether this disclosure was permitted under one of the DPPA’s 
exceptions listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). The Village posited that the relevant 
inquiry for a claim under the DPPA “is not whether the [Village] used the 
information permissibly, but whether [it] had a permissible purpose.”147 The 
majority, however, examined the statute’s purpose and legislative intent and 
narrowly defined the term “for use” contained within the exceptions.148 “For 
use” according to the majority, means “that the actual information disclosed—
i.e., the disclosure as it existed in fact—must be information that is used for the 
 
 139. Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 695 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2850 (2013). 
 140. Id. at 603 (majority opinion); Id. at 612 (Posner, J., dissenting); Id. (Flaum, J., 
dissenting). 
 141. Senne, 695 F.3d at 603 (majority opinion). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Brief of the Defendant-Appellee Vill. of Palatine, Ill., supra note 138, at 9. 
 144. Id. at 11–12. 
 145. Senne, 695 F.3d at 603. 
 146. Id. (majority opinion); Id. at 612 (Posner, J., dissenting); Id. (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
 147. Brief of the Defendant-Appellee Vill. of Palatine, Ill., supra note 138, at 20. 
 148. Senne, 695 F.3d at 605–06. 
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identified purpose.”149 If “for use” is not interpreted in this manner, the 
majority argued that “the statute’s purpose of safeguarding information for 
security and safety reasons . . . is frustrated.”150 Although it agreed that the 
citation did constitute service of process in an administrative proceeding and 
that its issuance was a function of the Village’s police department, the majority 
ultimately found that the “complaint does put in issue whether all of the 
disclosed information actually was used in effectuating either of these 
purposes.”151 Therefore, the court remanded the case to the district court to 
determine if each piece of personal information was actually used for these 
purposes.152 However, the majority did state that for some of the information 
disclosed, it would be “difficult to conceive, even on a theoretical level, how 
such information could play a role in the expected law enforcement 
purposes.”153 
The two dissenting opinions addressed the issue of permitted uses and 
readily disagreed with the majority’s narrow interpretation.154 Even Judge 
Posner, who professed he was “not a fan of literal interpretation,”155 
emphasized in his dissent that literal interpretation “is the proper default rule 
when it has reasonable consequences and there is no indication that the 
legislature stumbled in trying to translate legislative purpose into words.”156 
Based upon this principle, Judge Posner argued that the literal interpretation of 
the statute’s exceptions clearly allows the Village’s law enforcement agency to 
disclose this information on its parking tickets.157 He emphasized that the 
issuance of the parking ticket was an administrative proceeding, and the 
“personal information on the parking ticket placed on the windshield of the 
alleged violator’s vehicle is ‘for use in connection with’ an ‘administrative . . . 
proceeding’ in a ‘local court,’ and more specifically the ‘service of process’ 
phase of the proceeding.”158 As the ticket is process and the conventional 
method of serving it is on the windshield of the violator’s car, a literal 
interpretation is that “the police can place personal information on the 
ticket.”159 
The conflicting interpretations of the DPPA by the majority and the 
dissents pose larger questions of judicial interpretation. Does the statute’s 
 
 149. Id. at 606. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 608. 
 152. Id. at 609. 
 153. Senne, 695 F.3d at 608. 
 154. Id. at 609–12 (Posner, J., dissenting); Id. at 612–617 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id. at 609 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 610. 
 158. Senne, 695 F.3d at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 159. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
864 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:847 
language present enough ambiguity to look to legislative intent or is the literal 
wording sufficiently unambiguous? Even if the language is ambiguous, which 
interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent? These questions are 
examined below.160 
V.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE DPPA 
A. Did the Seventh Circuit Legislate? 
Under the plain meaning doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that in 
regards to judicial interpretation of a statute, first a court must “determine 
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with 
regard to the particular dispute in the case.”161 The judicial inquiry “must cease 
if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent 
and consistent.’”162 In support of this method of interpretation, the Court has 
emphasized that Congress’s “authoritative statement is the statutory text, not 
the legislative history.”163 
Although courts are often tempted to use legislative history, many 
academics complain that when they do, judges are similar to “scavengers 
rummaging through ‘the ashcans of the legislative process.’”164 Former Circuit 
Court Judge and Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs, Patricia 
Wald, noted that in her experience, legislative history materials’ “reliability, 
relevance, and thoroughness” are “significant concerns.”165 She emphasized 
that “[m]uch of the pertinent legislative discussion is unrecorded or 
inadequately recorded[;] . . . what is said by the opponents of a proposed bill 
cannot be trusted and many proponents will not have read or understood the 
bill.”166 These materials “do not, and probably never will, accurately and 
comprehensively record what actually took place during the convoluted 
process of enactment.”167 Instead, when a judge consults these materials, it is 
akin to “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.”168 For these 
reasons, judges should be cautious when consulting legislative intent unless the 
statutory language is ambiguous. 
 
 160. See infra Part V. 
 161. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). 
 162. Id. (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). 
 163. Chamber of Comm. of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1980 (2011) (citing Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)). 
 164. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 200 (1983). 
 165. Id. at 195, 200. 
 166. Id. at 200. 
 167. Id. at 216. 
 168. Id. at 214 (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal). 
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1. The Plain Meaning of the DPPA 
In Senne, the majority stated that the plain text of the statute narrowly 
limits the personal information that can be released under the statute’s 
exceptions.169 The court asserted the statutory purpose, “clear from its 
language alone, is to prevent all but a limited range of authorized 
disclosures . . .” because the statute starts with a broad prohibition of 
disclosure and then lists fourteen specific exceptions.170 Therefore, the “for 
use” language at the beginning of every exception should also be interpreted 
narrowly in that the “actual information disclosed—i.e., the disclosure as it 
existed in fact—must be information that is used for the identified purpose.”171 
To support this view, the majority noted that under the DPPA, highly-restricted 
personal information (i.e. social security numbers) can be disclosed for 
governmental functions and legal proceedings without the person’s express 
consent.172 The court stated, based on this provision, that using the Village’s 
broad interpretation would allow the Village to print this highly-restricted 
personal information on its publically displayed tickets in violation of the 
statute’s “chief aim of privacy protection.”173 In conclusion, the court 
maintained that without its narrow interpretation of the “for use” language, the 
statute’s purpose of “safeguarding information for security and safety reasons” 
is frustrated.174 
Although the court pointed to the DPPA’s structure to support its narrow 
interpretation of “for use,”175 it likely used legislative history to shape its 
analysis. The language of 18 U.S.C. § 2721 begins with a general prohibition 
of disclosure of personal DMV information and then immediately lists fourteen 
exceptions where this information “may be disclosed.”176 Based solely on this 
structure, the majority argued that disclosure under the statute is only allowed 
in limited circumstances; therefore, those circumstances should also be 
interpreted narrowly.177 However, in its opinion, the majority did not highlight 
that: (1) the exceptions themselves contain no additional limiting language; (2) 
the types of users for the exceptions vary greatly to include government 
agencies, insurers, statistical researchers, private investigative agencies, private 
employers, and marketers; and (3) the DPPA contains fourteen exceptions.178 
 
 169. Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 695 F.3d 597, 606 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2850 (2013). 
 170. Id. at 605. 
 171. Id. at 606. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Senne, 695 F.3d at 606. 
 175. Id. 
 176. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)–(b)(14) (2000). 
 177. Senne, 695 F.3d at 606. 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). 
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These aspects of the statute tend to support a broader interpretation of the 
exceptions’ language. However, the majority likely reached its narrower 
interpretation through its limited review of the legislative history. In its 
examination of legislative history, the majority extracted specific comments by 
Senator Tom Harkin stating that the law enforcement exception was not meant 
to be a “gaping loophole” in the statute.179 The court also noted Senator John 
Warner’s statement that “[t]here are specific exceptions of course for law 
enforcement individuals and other areas where proven experience shows that 
this information should flow. But in those instances we have to presume it is 
somewhat protected.”180 These pieces of legislative history likely shaped the 
majority’s interpretation leading them to focus on the “limiting” structure of 
the overall statute, and to deemphasize the exceptions’ broad characteristics. 
The dissenting Judges presented a strong argument in favor of a broad 
interpretation as the unambiguous, literal interpretation of the DPPA.181 The 
exceptions analyzed in Senne state that: 
Personal information . . . may be disclosed182 . . . [f]or use by any government 
agency, including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its 
functions183 . . . [and] [f]or use in connection with any civil, criminal, 
administrative, or arbitral proceeding in any Federal, State, or local court or 
agency or before any self-regulatory body, including the service of 
process . . . .184 
Although the majority applies a narrow limitation on these uses,185 the 
plain language of this statute does not make any reference to limiting the 
party’s use of this information for the stated purposes.186 As the dissents 
emphasized, “[t]he text of the DPPA simply does not contain the ‘actual use’ 
limitation that the majority reads into it”187 nor does it “limit disclosure that 
falls within one of its exceptions to what is ‘reasonable’ or ‘necessary,’ or 
authorize judges to impose such a requirement.”188 Although the court stated 
that it “[does] not read ‘use’ to mean ‘necessary use,’ nor [does it] require the 
Village to adopt some form of ‘best practices,’”189 the majority did in fact 
 
 179. Senne, 695 F.3d at 608 (quoting 139 CONG. REC. S15,962 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) 
(statement of Sen. Harkin)). 
 180. Senne, 695 F.3d at 608 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 139 CONG. REC. S15,764 (daily ed. 
Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Warner)). 
 181. Id. at 609–10 (Posner, J., dissenting); Id. at 612–14 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
 182. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). 
 183. Id. § 2721(b)(1). 
 184. Id. § 2721(b)(4). 
 185. See supra notes 148–153 and accompanying text. 
 186. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). 
 187. Senne, 695 F.3d at 616 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. at 606–07 n.12 (majority opinion). 
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impose a “necessary use” form of best practices by holding that the Village is 
liable for any disclosure of information that is not specifically “used for the 
identified purpose.”190 
Furthermore, although the majority correctly recognized that the “chief 
aim” of the DPPA was for “privacy protection,”191 it discounted that one of the 
central purposes of the statute, which is made clear from its language, is to 
balance the need for privacy protection with the need for government agencies 
and other organizations to use this information.192 The language of the DPPA 
begins with the prohibition that a “State department of motor vehicles, and any 
officer, employee, or contractor thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or 
otherwise make available to any person or entity” a driver’s personal 
information.193 However, in the next subsection, the statute immediately 
articulates fourteen exceptions that provide for access and use of this 
information.194 The majority noted that from this structure, “the statute’s 
purpose, clear from its language alone, is to prevent all but a limited range of 
authorized disclosures of information contained in individual motor vehicle 
records.”195 However, the court then proceeded to read this “limited range” of 
fourteen exceptions even more narrowly and discount that the structure of the 
statute also shows its purpose was to balance privacy protection with 
government agencies’ use of this information.196 The governmental functions 
and service of process exceptions, from their language, alone make “clear that 
Congress intended to leave states with considerable leeway.”197 Although the 
majority was rightly concerned that this broad interpretation allows the Village 
to print highly-restricted personal information on its parking tickets,198 
Congress should make these modifications to the statute, instead of the courts 
limiting the text after the fact and punishing municipalities for this disclosure. 
The text is clear that in balancing the protection of this highly restricted 
information and the government’s need for it, the drafters determined that, for 
certain exceptions, unrestricted use and access to this information was 
essential. The statute does not limit the government and other agencies’ use of 
this information under these particular exceptions, but defers to their 
discretion. In fact, the drafters felt so strongly about it that they allowed the 
 
 190. Id. at 606. 
 191. Id. 
 192. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000). 
 193. Id. § 2721(a). 
 194. Id. § 2721(b). 
 195. Senne, 695 F.3d at 605. 
 196. See supra notes 148–153 and accompanying text; 18 U.S.C. § 2721. 
 197. Senne, 695 F.3d at 614 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
 198. Id. at 606. 
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government and other agencies to use this highly-restricted personal 
information without the parties’ consent.199 
When examining the statute’s text, the majority may have allowed pieces 
of the statute’s legislative history to shape its narrow interpretation; however, 
as presented by the dissent, the language of the statute unambiguously grants 
government agencies unlimited discretion in using this information for their 
core governmental functions.200 
2. What was Congress’s Intent? 
The DPPA’s language is unambiguous enough that courts need not look to 
legislative history. But even if courts did, the Senne majority’s interpretation 
may be at odds with Congress’s original intent. 
After its analysis of the statutory text, the court turned to the legislative 
history to bolster its narrow interpretation.201 The majority briefly mentioned 
the numerous crimes discussed in the congressional hearings, but it failed to 
emphasize that all of these crimes were committed in connection with 
obtaining information from state DMVs for a nominal fee.202 The majority 
focused mainly on testimony from Senator Harkin who stated that the law 
enforcement exception is not a “gaping loophole in this law” but provides 
these agencies “with latitude in receiving and disseminating . . . personal 
information” when done “for the purpose of deterring or preventing crime or 
other legitimate law enforcement functions.”203 With this limited review of the 
statute’s history, the majority deemed that “Congress did not intend that the 
statutory exceptions be divorced, logically or practically, from the purpose of 
the statute.”204 
However, the majority’s interpretation of the legislative history discounted 
that the original purpose for this statute was to protect against criminals 
purchasing personal information from state DMVs.205 The legislative history is 
full of stories involving information obtained in this manner and does not 
contain any stories alluding to crimes committed by criminals obtaining 
personal information from parking tickets.206 In addition, as Judge Posner 
 
 199. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(2) (stating that a party cannot disclose or otherwise make available 
highly restricted personal information without the express consent of the person to whom it 
applies, except for uses permitted under governmental functions, (b)(1), service of process, (b)(4), 
insurance investigations, (b)(6), and commercial driver’s license verifications, (b)(9)). 
 200. Senne, 695 F.3d at 616–17 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
 201. Id. at 607–08 (majority opinion). 
 202. Id. at 607. 
 203. Id. at 608 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 139 CONG. REC. S15,962 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 
1993) (statement of Sen. Harkin)). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See supra notes 13, 18–30 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Id. 
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observed, even Senne’s lawyer admitted at oral argument that he had never 
heard of such a thing.207 
Furthermore, the majority overlooked the balancing purpose of the statute. 
The legislative history plainly states, “The purpose of this Act is to protect the 
personal privacy and safety of licensed drivers consistent with the legitimate 
needs of business and government.”208 The legislative history of the DPPA 
“does not convey an intent to eliminate any and all dangers that can be traced 
back to the disclosure of information from the motor vehicle records,”209 
otherwise, the statute would have no exceptions to permit additional use of this 
information. Instead of attempting to protect against “all imaginable dangers,” 
Congress emphasized its “intent to prevent the specific danger that arises when 
individuals are able to obtain personal information upon request from state 
motor vehicle records.”210 Furthermore, in listing these exceptions, the 
legislative history clearly shows that Congress respected the need for this 
information for government functions and proceedings.211 Senator Boxer, the 
main proponent of this statute, emphasized the importance of striking “a 
critical balance between the legitimate governmental and business needs for 
this information, and the fundamental right of our people to privacy and 
safety.”212 Even Senator Harkin stressed the importance of the law 
enforcement exception, stating it “should be interpreted so as not to in any way 
restrict or hinder successful law enforcement and crime prevention 
strategies.”213 Instead, Senator Harkin thought the threshold question should be 
“whether the law enforcement agency’s action is taken in carrying out its 
functions.”214 In situations like the one presented in Senne, the Village could 
easily argue its use of this information was just an action “taken in carrying out 
its functions.”215 
If Congress now disagrees with the rule it codified into law, it “remains at 
liberty to amend the statute, and, for the policy reasons advanced by the 
majority, it may well see the need to do so.”216 However, the judiciary should 
be cautious to create unclear disclosure guidelines for municipalities that are 
not explicitly in the statute’s text. 
 
 207. Senne, 695 F.3d at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 208. 139 CONG. REC. 26,266 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 209. Senne, 695 F.3d at 614 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
 210. Id. 
 211. See infra text accompanying notes 212–13. 
 212. 139 CONG. REC. S29,468 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer). 
 213. 139 CONG. REC. S29,697 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (statement of Sen. Harkin). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 695 F.3d 597, 614 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Flaum, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2850 (2013). 
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B. Possible Constitutional Problems 
In its writ of certiorari, the Village urged the Supreme Court to take this 
case, and one of its central arguments stressed that the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of the DPPA could create constitutional problems.217 In Reno v. 
Condon, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the DPPA based on the 
Commerce Clause powers of the federal government. The Court found that this 
personal information was an “article of commerce” sold by the States to parties 
“engaged in interstate commerce” for them to use to “contact drivers with 
customized solicitations,” and used in the “stream of interstate commerce” by 
various entities in regards to interstate motoring.218 Therefore, the disclosure of 
this information into the “interstate stream of business is sufficient to support 
congressional regulation.”219 However, the Village argued that under the 
majority’s interpretation, Congress is not simply regulating inherently 
interstate commercial activity, but instead it is regulating “States or 
municipalities when [it uses] personal information to carry out core, non-
commercial government functions like issuing parking tickets.”220 Therefore, 
this interpretation could make the DPPA unconstitutional because regulating 
the noncommercial disclosure by state government agencies would seem to fall 
outside Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.221 According to the Village, 
“the en banc court violated the cardinal rule that ‘where an otherwise 
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional 
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless 
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.’”222 Congress, 
by not expressly limiting state and municipal use of this information, may have 
intended to avoid this constitutional issue, and if that is the case, “the en banc 
court interpreted the DPPA to interfere with the very state and local 
government functions Congress clearly left undisturbed.”223 
VI.  WHAT EFFECT COULD THIS INTERPRETATION POTENTIALLY HAVE ON 
OTHER MUNICIPALITIES? 
Although the majority stated in a footnote that a discussion of potential 
damages at this point would be “premature,”224 Judge Posner stressed that this 
 
 217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 134, at 3. 
 218. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 134, at 25. 
 221. Id. at 8, 25. 
 222. Id. at 25 (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng’rs, 
531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001)). 
 223. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 134, at 21. 
 224. Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 695 F.3d 597, 609 n.20 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2850 (2013). 
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view may be “short sighted” because “[b]efore creating a new cause of action, 
a court should consider the consequences.”225 As for the Village of Palatine, it 
claims to have issued approximately 32,000 parking tickets in the last four 
years;226 therefore, at just the minimum liquidated damages of $2500 per 
ticket, the Village is potentially facing $80 million in liability.227 Given the 
population of Palatine, that total is approximately $1000 per resident.228 These 
damages “are more than 100 times the total revenue generated by the parking 
tickets at issue.”229 Furthermore, the Village’s counsel during the en banc 
hearing stated that just in examining the municipalities surrounding Chicago, 
he had found ten other municipalities that included the owner’s name on their 
parking tickets, six that included the owner’s name and address, and one that 
also included the driver’s license number.230 Senne’s attorney argued that 
based on this statute, the only information municipalities should include on 
parking tickets is the vehicle’s tag number, which is the current practice in 
Chicago.231 When asked about this particular procedure in Palatine, the 
Village’s counsel stated that the pieces of information on its parking tickets are 
required for a moving violation under Illinois law; therefore, the Village 
simply used the same information on its parking and speeding tickets.232 In its 
12(b)(6) motion, the Village did not provide a reason for its use of some of this 
information (i.e., eye color, height, weight) in a governmental or service of 
process capacity;233 however, it could have made the argument that the 
information was for police pedigree purposes or to prevent and detect potential 
profiling. Furthermore, as Judge Posner illustrated, this information could also 
be used to serve a “modest error-correction function,” to ensure the DMV’s 
information was still correct.234 Although these purposes could prove that each 
piece of information was “necessary for use” in connection with a 
governmental function under the majority’s narrow interpretation of the 
statute,235 such analysis is unnecessary if the Seventh Circuit had followed the 
dissents’ literal interpretation of the statute. Instead, the majority’s opinion 
 
 225. Id. at 612 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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could cause every police department in the Seventh Circuit to be sued for 
parking tickets issued over the past four years because “the statute [did] not 
place Palatine or any other community on notice that including personal 
information on a parking ticket is prohibited.”236 As Judge Posner aptly stated, 
only “scofflaws,” not innocent victims, benefit from this decision and “[f]rom 
now until the statute is amended . . . only a sucker would park legally in the 
Village of Palatine.”237 
CONCLUSION 
Although the majority stated its interpretation of the DPPA was based 
solely on its text, its narrow interpretation was more likely influenced by its 
analysis of the legislative history. Congress enacted the DPPA to prevent 
crimes resulting from criminals obtaining DMV information for a fee, not to 
punish municipalities for providing safe thoroughfares in their communities. 
The purpose of this statute was to balance the need for privacy protection and 
the legitimate need for access to this information. In addition, the plain 
meaning of the statute does not contain any language limiting municipalities’ 
use of this information in performing their governmental functions or in 
serving process. Therefore, the judiciary should be careful not to limit the 
scope of the exceptions under the DPPA and cross over into the realm of 
legislating. 
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